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Abstract 
The relationship between institutional fragmentation of urban regions and inequality in 
government service levels is subject to a long-running debate. On the one hand, neo-progressive 
reformers argue that fragmented municipal institutions produce a systematic mismatch between 
fiscal resources and public needs and thereby perpetuate income inequality. On the other hand, 
public choice scholars hold that polycentric government is more responsive to residents’ needs, 
and that issues of income distribution can be addressed by intergovernmental coordination. 
However, the role of this multi-level intergovernmental compound of metropolitan governance in 
tackling territorial inequalities remains unclear. This paper aims to contribute to the further 
development of this debate, by drawing on a comprehensive analysis of social policy efforts at 
the municipal level in the seven largest metropolitan areas in Switzerland. We explore the effect 
of social segregation, municipal resources, residents’ political preferences, efforts of higher state 
levels, as well as transfer systems on per capita social expenditures in metropolitan 
municipalities. The results show that, while multi-level intergovernmental mechanisms do play a 
moderating role, institutional fragmentation is an obstacle to matching fiscal resources with 
social policy needs. In the fragmented setting of the Swiss metropolis, social policies at the 
municipal level mainly appear as an act of political voluntarism by the rich, rather than as a 
matter of redistribution oriented by principles of social justice. 
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1 Introduction 1 
The relationship between institutional fragmentation of urban regions and inequality in 
government service levels is subject to a long-running debate. On the one hand, it is argued that 
fragmented governmental settings produce a systematic mismatch between fiscal resources and 
public needs and thereby perpetuate income inequality. On the other hand, polycentric 
government is presented as more responsive to residents’ needs, and it is argued that issues of 
income distribution can be addressed by voluntary inter-municipal agreements. At the heart of the 
debate is the question to understand "the redistributive consequences of fragmented governmental 
structures within metropolitan areas" (Lowery, 1999b: 8).  
This paper aims to contribute to this debate by a comprehensive empirical analysis of the seven 
largest metropolitan areas in Switzerland, studying the relationship between territorial patterns of 
resident wealth on the one hand, and levels of municipal public services on the other hand. 
Focusing particularly on the effect of intergovernmental cooperation in the metropolitan areas 
under scrutiny, we aim to explore the redistributive effects of the multi-level compound of 
governance that often characterises metropolitan areas.   
The analysis is presented in four steps. In the theoretical section, we review and discuss the main 
arguments of the debate on the relationship between institutional fragmentation and social 
inequality and present its major propositions that will be at the core of the empirical enquiry. We 
then briefly expose the data and method used, before presenting the empirical findings. In the 
discussion, we wrap up the findings and discuss their relevance.  
2.  Sorting and public service in the fragmented metropolis: 
theoretical expectations 
In many countries across the world, urban areas have expanded irrespective of administrative 
boundaries of local government. Institutional fragmentation of metropolitan areas is widespread. 
Obvious drawbacks resulting from this situation have sparked a long-running scientific debate 
about the best way to organize governance in metropolitan areas. This debate has coined three 
intellectual traditions (for an overview see Ostrom, 1972, Lefèvre, 1998, Lowery, 1999a, Kübler, 
                                                 
1  This paper is based on research conducted for the project Cleavages, governance and the media in European metropolitan 
areas, financed by the National Centre of Competence in Research Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century at the 
University of Zurich.  
4 
2003, Savitch and Vogel, 2009). The first, so-called metropolitan reform tradition, advocates 
institutional consolidation by territorial reforms, arguing that service delivery will be more 
efficient and socially equitable when governmental units are larger. In stark contrast to this, the 
public choice perspective argues that institutional fragmentation of metropolitan areas is 
desirable, as it leads to competition between local governments and thereby to efficient allocation 
of public resources. Public choice scholars hold that area-wide governance will emerge by itself, 
as localities engage in voluntary cooperation and settle conflicts between them in order to realize 
economies of scale. Emphasising the merits of self-governance between autonomous localities, 
the public choice perspective therefore strongly opposes institutional consolidation and 
centralized government as advocated by the metropolitan reformers. For a long time, the debate 
on metropolitan governance has been characterized by a confrontation between these two 
perspectives, leading to a dispute between advocates and opponents of institutional consolidation 
(Lowery, 1999a) via municipal amalgamation, city-county consolidation (in the USA) or the 
setting up of new scales of government at the metropolitan level - so-called metropolitan 
governments. More recently however, a third perspective has emerged, emphasizing the genuine 
role of formal and informal policy- networks in metropolitan governance (Wallis, 1994, Savitch 
and Vogel, 2000, Brenner, 2002). Provisionally labelled new regionalism, this third perspective 
conveys a more relaxed view on the design of institutional territorial institutions in metropolitan 
areas. Routes to new regionalism, it is argued, can be diverse (Savitch and Vogel, 2000): they 
may include institutional consolidation, but intergovernmental cooperation between autonomous 
localities, or policy-networks involving non-state actors are considered as functional equivalents, 
as long as they successfully associate those actors that are relevant to policy-making. 
2.1 The Social Stratification and Government Inequality (SSGI) thesis 
Equity has been at the very heart of the debate on metropolitan governance ever since, and has 
been a matter of intensive dispute between metropolitan reformers and public choice theorists. In 
a nutshell, the dispute is about whether the fragmentation of metropolitan areas into a large 
number of autonomous jurisdictions perpetuates and reinforces social inequalities - as the 
metropolitan reformers claim - or whether it does not - as the public choice theorists argue.  
The metropolitan reform position has been elaborated in what is known as the Social 
Stratification and Government Inequality (SSGI) thesis. It was originally developed by Hill 
(1974) and Neiman (1976) on the basis of evidence showing that social inequality in US 
metropolitan areas is strongly associated with the degree of governmental fragmentation. They 
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argue that a fragmented governmental setting, against the background of residential sorting and 
social segregation, leads to a situation where poor municipalities lack the public resources 
necessary to address their residents' needs. In addition, the small size of jurisdictions in 
fragmented settings enables concentrations of wealthy residents to influence municipal policies 
so as to reduce redistribution and keep taxes low. The result is a systematic mismatch between 
resources and needs, whereby income inequalities are perpetuated and even reinforced. In an 
article published in the early 1980s, Elinor Ostrom (1983) provides a compelling synthesis of the 
SSGI thesis as a set of eight propositions (see Box): 
Box 1: Eight propositions derived from the SSGI thesis 
P1: Families with similar resources, beliefs and habits regarding living patterns will tend to seek residences near 
one another. 
P2: Residents tend to use municipal powers, such as zoning and other land use controls, to enhance the relative 
fiscal position of the jurisdiction in which they live and the social homogeneity of the neighbourhood in 
which they live. 
P3: Suburban municipalities are consequently divided into many relatively homogenous communities of the poor, 
the middle class, and the wealthy. 
P4: The larger the number of the municipal governments in the metropolitan community, the greater the 
inequality in the distribution of fiscal and other resources among them. 
P5: 'The higher the social status of a jurisdiction, the greater the level of resources available to support public 
services' (Neiman, 1982: 221). 
P6: The higher the level of public resources allocated to a service, the higher the level of services received by a 
population living in a jurisdiction. 
P7: Central cities tend to allocate services in favour of the poor. 
 Thus 
P8:  'Municipal government becomes an institutional arrangement for promoting and protecting the unequal 
distribution of scarce resources' (Hill 1974: 1559).  
Quoted from Ostrom (1983: 94-95) 
 
Numerous empirical investigations on metropolitan social segregation, mainly in the US, rest 
upon the SSGI thesis. A drastic illustration is the American Apartheid argument made by Massey 
(1993), according to which the governmental fragmentation of the US metropolis has perpetuated 
and reinforced racial segregation and poverty among African-Americans. In a similar vein but 
more subtly, Downs (1994) has pointed out the  mechanisms of exclusionary zoning, by which 
small-sized and wealthy jurisdictions use their autonomy to restrict housing choices for 
disadvantaged groups and ensure that the rich can stay among themselves (Downs, 1994). And, 
based on a transaction cost model, Lowery (2000) has shown that governmental fragmentation of 
the US metropolis enables the rich to sort into wealthy municipalities thanks to the reduction of 
information costs in residential choices.  
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2.2 Debating the SSGI thesis  
Elinor Ostrom, in her article, not only provides an overview of the main propositions forming the 
SSGI thesis, but mainly aims at formulating a consistent public choice critique (Ostrom, 1983). 
For a start, she argues that there is enough theoretical and empirical evidence to accept P1 
(residential sorting according to social status and lifestyles) , as well as P2 (residents' preferences 
shape municipal policies) as plausible. But the remaining propositions, she argues, are highly 
questionable. Empirical evidence in support of  P3 (emergence of distinct and homogenous 
wealthy,  middle class and poor suburbs) is scarce; examinations of P4 (governmental 
fragmentation reinforces fiscal imbalances) generally suffer methodological shortcomings;  
evidence regarding P5 (wealthy jurisdictions will spend more on public services) suggests that 
the effects of social status on local expenditures are complex, due to the multi-level character of 
metropolitan governance that influences or compensates local choices;  P6 (high expenditures 
means high levels of service) downplays differences in service efficiency across municipalities; 
P7 (central cities are more attentive to the needs of the poor)  ignores that smaller bureaucratic 
units can be more responsive to residents than larger ones. Finally, given the shaky empirical or 
theoretical basis of the previous propositions on which it is based, Ostrom concludes that P8 is 
unwarranted and must be refuted.  
In her argumentation against the SSGI thesis, Ostrom pinpoints that much of the existing research 
on the relationship between governmental fragmentation and social inequality in metropolitan 
settings does not pay sufficient attention to the multi-level character of  metropolitan governance. 
The main problem of existing SSGI research, she argues, is that it suffers from a problem of 
scope: "The SSGI assertion that fragmentation is the cause of inequity in service delivery ignores 
the role of overlapping governmental units in redistributing resources at county, state, and federal 
levels to municipalities with a poor resource base. … To understand distribution patterns in 
metropolitan areas, one must examine the compound system and not just one horizontal layer" 
(Ostrom, 1983: 93). 
Reacting to Ostrom's critique from a neoprogressive (i.e. renewed metropolitan reform)  
perspective, Lowery (1999b) takes the debate a step further. On the one hand, he argues that new 
empirical evidence in fact buttresses the SSGI thesis assumptions on residential sorting and 
segregation in the US metropolitan areas (P1 to P4). There is now a more fine-grained 
understanding on segregation as an effect of sorting rather than exclusion, i.e. pull factors (e.g. 
municipal tax-service packages) are more important for residential choices than push factors (e.g. 
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housing, job opportunities, family reasons). In the US, these pull factors continue to make race 
the most powerful aspect of social sorting in the housing market, and Lowery quotes evidence 
showing that P3 is indeed plausible: income sorting and racial segregation by jurisdiction has 
increased in US metropolitan areas since the 1990s, with the obvious effect on municipal tax-
bases. Regarding spending choices of municipalities (P5 and P6), Lowery quotes evidence from 
the US to show that Tiebout competition between municipalities in governmentally fragmented 
metro areas is indeed associated with low spending and low taxes, rather than more services for 
the poor.  
On the other hand, Lowery takes a strong stance against Ostrom's rebuttal argument that 
intergovernmental coordination shapes distribution patterns in metropolitan areas. He agrees with 
Ostrom that it is theoretically plausible to assume a role for higher level governments or 
voluntary intermunicipal agreements: State governments could indeed decide and enforce 
redistributive policies, or municipalities could indeed agree on a plan to share their tax-base.  But 
he argues that, at least in the US, this is simply not going to happen: "As a realistic prescription 
of a practical solution to the problems raised by the SSGI thesis, it leaves much to be desired. … 
Still, redistribution by higher levels of government is an attractive solution to the SSGI problem. 
So too is the Independence Day  notion that an invasion from outer space will erase ancient 
racial, ethnic, and class divisions as we discover shared interests in a common struggle to kill 
aliens. It remains unclear which will occur first" (Lowery, 1999b: 16). As long as the multi-level 
compound of metropolitan governance does not engage in redistribution, he argues, the SSGI 
thesis is still valid.  
Lowery's rejoinder also explicitly addresses the new regionalist idea of heterarchical policy-
networks playing a role in metropolitan governance. Given the fact that these policy-networks are 
consensus based, they are unsuitable for redistribution: "Any one city government can veto 
redistribution among the separate governments found within a metropolitan area" (Lowery, 
1999b: 16). It follows from this that the contribution of new regionalist approaches to improve 
metropolitan governance is limited to policies and services that produce a collective benefit: 
examples would be transport, economic development, or amenities such as theaters, operas, 
concert halls. However, new regionalist approaches will be inherently unsuitable for zero-sum 
games such as redistribution - where you take from some to give to others.  
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2.1 Exploring the SSGI thesis in the Swiss context 
From a research perspective, the current state of the debate suggests several avenues for research 
that need to be embraced for the further development of the SSGI thesis.  
First and most importantly, knowledge about the possible redistributive effects of the multi-level 
compound of metropolitan governance - as pointed out by Ostrom - is still lacking.  All the while 
Lowery's theoretical and empirical arguments about the unlikeliness of such an effect are 
plausible, it should not be ex ante excluded that it actually happens - under conditions and 
circumstances that remain to be identified.  
Second, and related to the first point, it is striking to note that political science research on the 
SSGI thesis seems to have been limited to the US context. It is thus unclear to what extent the 
propositions and findings can be generalized, particularly when we want to better understand the 
redistributive effects of arrangements of multi-level governance, and the conditions under which 
such effects occur. Indeed, if we follow Lowery, examples of multi-level or voluntary 
redistributive policies are very rare in the US metropolitan areas, which hence do not appear as 
the best place to study them. It is therefore high time for an exploration of the SSGI thesis in a 
context outside the US.  
This is the goal of this paper, in which we explore, within Swiss metropolitan areas, the 
relationship between territorial patterns of resident wealth on the one hand, and levels of 
municipal public services on the other hand, and seek to account for the effects of intermunicipal 
cooperation and the activities of higher level governments on this relationship.  
3. Data and method  
The analysis in this paper implements a cross sectional research design focusing on 456 
municipalities located within the seven major Swiss metropolitan areas. We examine variations 
across these municipalities, cooperation between them, as well as their relationships with the next 
higher level government: the cantons.  
The analysis uses data compiled from three different official sources. First, data on the territorial 
extension and the institutional structure of metropolitan areas, as well as municipal-level 
aggregates of socio-demographics, geographical characteristics and election results was drawn 
from the website of the Swiss Statistical Office (SSO). Second, the core figures of Swiss public 
finance at the federal and the cantonal level stem from documents published by the Federal 
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Finance Administration (FFA), the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO), as well as the 
Federal Tax Administration (FTA). The FTA's website also provided municipal level aggregates 
of data on residents' taxable income, on income distribution within municipalities, as well as on 
the overall revenues from federal income tax. Third, public finance data of the 456 municipalities 
located within the metropolitan areas under scrutiny was collected from statistical offices and 
financial oversight authorities of the cantons to which these municipalities belong. Thanks to 
generous help of contact persons within these various organisations, data collection was largely 
unproblematic - as is testified by the low number of cases with missing values on some variables 
(a maximum of 19 out of 456) (see Table 9 in the methodological appendix).  
While the collection of data was quite straightforward, the operationalization of the variables 
proved to be a more challenging endeavour, especially for variables relating to municipal public 
finance. Efforts to standardise public sector accounting in the whole of Switzerland date back to 
the early 1980s, and have recently (in 2008) been strengthened with the publication of new 
guidelines (Harmonisiertes Rechnungslegungsmodell für die Kantone und Gemeinden) based on 
International Public Sector Accounting Standards.2 However, even though most of the twenty-six 
cantons and the municipalities within them now present their accounts according to common 
principles, some differences across cantons, and sometimes even differences across 
municipalities within cantons remain. In order to ensure the commensurability of municipal 
public finance data for the subsequent analysis, some reclassification and recoding of the data 
was necessary (see Table 9 in the methodological appendix).  
On the one hand, municipal expenditures were classified according to three broad functional 
categories: the first category consists of expenditures in the field of general administration, the 
second category contains redistributive expenditures (health, public transport, welfare) and the 
third summarizes expenditures for amenities and operational costs (leisure, culture, 
environmental protection, public safety, and industrial services). However, there are large 
differences across municipalities with respect to how they organise public schools and their 
budgets: in some municipalities, expenditures for schools would be included in the municipal 
budget, while others have an independent school district with its own budget.3 We therefore 
                                                 
2  See: www.ifac.org 
3  For example: in the canton Zurich, the school budget is accounted for differently across municipalities. Whereas some 
communes have a school budget, education is excluded into specialised entities, the Schulgemeinden (school communities), in 
other municipalities. 
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chose to exclude education from the functional classification of municipal expenditures 
altogether.  
On the other hand, particular care was given to the measurement of transfer payments in the 
public finances of a municipality - not only because transfer payments are a core aspect in this 
paper, but also because the precise labelling of transfer payments in the municipal accounts was 
found to vary considerably. More precisely, transfer expenditures were operationalized as the 
sum of expenditure entries labelled as 'compensation of other jurisdictions' (Entschädigungen an 
Gemeinwesen) or 'contributions' (Eigene Beiträge) to municipalities, the canton, the federation or 
intermunicipal cooperation schemes. Transfer revenues were operationalized as the sum of 
revenue entries labelled as 'refunds from other jurisdictions'  (Rückerstatttungen von 
Gemeinwesen) and 'contributions' (Beiträge für eigene Rechnung) from municipalities, the 
canton, the federation or intermunicipal cooperation schemes. This is a rather conservative 
operationalization of transfer payments - both for expenditures and revenues - as transfers might 
also be hiding in other parts of the municipal account. Moreover, this operationalization does not 
allow, for the time being, to distinguish between vertical transfers (i.e. between a municipality 
and higher levels of government) and horizontal transfers (i.e. between municipalities).  
4. Empirical findings  
4.1 Metropolitan areas in Switzerland: extension and institutional structure 
During the 20th century, Switzerland has been profoundly transformed by a still ongoing process 
of metropolitanization. This process has revealed a metamorphosis of relevant elements of urban 
centrality (seeBassand, 2005). Externally, metropolitanization involves the connection of urban 
societies to a global order of urban networks. Internally, it has led to a recomposition of the urban 
space, in the sense that metropolitan areas4 are nowadays the dominant form of human settlement 
in Switzerland. These metropolitan areas are increasingly functionally integrated, mainly thanks 
to the development of high capacity transport infrastructure. Spatial mobility of goods and 
persons allows an increasing functional specialization of soil, leading not only to accelerated 
                                                 
4  The notion of metropolitan area originates in the US Census Bureau’s terminology used to define areas of functionally 
integrated urban settlements spread over different administrative boundaries. The official nomenclature of territorial statistics 
used by the Swiss Statistical Office uses the term of agglomerations (in German: Agglomerationen; in French: 
agglomérations; in Italian: agglomerati). Commuter patterns are the core criterion used for their operational measurement 
Schuler, M. (1984) Abgrenzung der Agglomerationsräume in der Schweiz 1980/Délimitation des agglomérations en Suisse 
1980, Bern, Bundesamt für Statistik.. Conceptually, the Swiss agglomerations are thus equivalent to the US Metropolitan 
Areas Schuler, M. (1999) Régionalisation et urbanisation: des concepts convergents? Département d'Architecture. Lausanne, 
Ecole polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne.. Throughout this text, we will use the term 'metropolitan areas' as a synonym of 
agglomerations.  
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urban sprawl and further expansion of metropolitan areas, but in the same time to social 
segregation within them.  
Among the fifty functional metropolitan areas delimited in the latest available official definition 
(Schuler et al., 2005b), seven have a population close to or more than 200’000 inhabitants and are 
included in the subsequent analysis: the metropolitan areas of Zurich, Basle, Geneva, Berne, 
Lausanne, Lucerne and Lugano (Table 1). Taken together, they cover the territory of 456 
municipalities5 and total roughly three million inhabitants, thereby representing about sixty 
percent of the country's urban population.  
Table 1: Demographic and institutional structure of seven major Swiss metropolitan areas 2010 
Metropolitan area  Overall population  Overall number of municipalities 
Index of geopolitical 
fragmentation 
Zurich  1,185,214  131  3.5 
Basle*  501,285  74  4.4 
Geneva*  527,764  74  4.0 
Berne  352,470  42  3.4 
Lausanne  334,908  69  5.4 
Lucerne  209,224  16  2.1 
Lugano*  140,629  50  8.9 
*excluding municipalities located in neighbouring countries of cross‐border metropolitan areas
Source: Swiss Statistical Office, population census data 
 
In contrast to most countries of Northern Europe, the local government structure in Switzerland 
has not been subject to comprehensive territorial reforms in the 20th century. Municipal 
amalgamations have taken place incrementally and sporadically. As a consequence, 
municipalities are small and suburbanization is high; in a typical Swiss metropolitan area, 
roughly two thirds of the overall population lives in suburbs outside the core city. This is 
reflected in the index of geopolitical fragmentation (Zeigler and Brunn, 1980) of Swiss 
metropolitan areas (Table 1). In international comparison, geopolitical fragmentation of Swiss 
metropolitan areas is among the highest in the developed world (overall index value 7.3) and, in 
that, comparable to the institutional structure found in metropolitan areas of the United States  
which is highly fragmented as well (overall index value: 7.1) (Hoffmann-Martinot and Sellers, 
2005). 
                                                 
5  This number does not include the municipalities of international metropolitan areas (Basle and Geneva) located outside of 
Switzerland.  
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4.2 Territorial patterns of social disparities in the Swiss metropolis 
Residential segregation across municipalities within Swiss metropolitan areas has increased 
towards the end of the 20th century (Huissoud et al., 1999), not only with respect to social status 
(i.e. mainly income), but increasingly with respect to choices of lifestyle (Hermann et al., 2005). 
Patterns of residential segregation in Swiss metropolitan areas do not simply set off the core 
cities from the suburbs, but social disparities also exist across the suburbs. These patterns are 
captured by the typology of Swiss municipalities used by the Statistical Office (Joye et al., 1988, 
Schuler et al., 2005a), that distinguishes four types of municipalities within Swiss metropolitan 
areas:  core cities, inner suburbs, affluent suburbs and periurban suburbs. 6  These municipalities 
are distinct not only with respect to their geographical characteristics and location within the 
metropolitan areas, but also in terms of social status of their residents. For the seven metropolitan 
areas under scrutiny here, this is nicely shown in Table 2:  
- Core cities are large and have a socially heterogeneous population, with very high 
proportions of immigrants. The unemployment rate is high and resident's wealth is low.  
- Municipalities in the inner suburban belt are smaller than core cities, but still relatively 
large. The share of immigrants is above average, as is the unemployment rate. Resident 
wealth is below average - these clearly are the poor suburbs of Swiss metropolitan areas.  
- Affluent suburbs are distinctive for their very high level of resident wealth, epitomized by 
the high average taxable income. Proportions of immigrants are relatively high. But to the 
difference of the other suburbs, these are mostly high skilled migrants.  
- Periurban suburbs are located at the outskirts of the metropolitan areas. They are rather 
small in terms of population and density is low. The share of recently constructed, single 
family housing is high. The proportion of immigrants is very low and resident wealth is 
average.  
 
 
                                                 
6  The original denomination of these types of municipalities are centres (core city), communes suburbaines (inner suburbs), 
communes riches (affluent suburbs), communes périurbaines (periurban suburbs).  
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Table 2: Social disparities within the seven major Swiss metropolitan areas; in 2006/10 
   Core cities 
Inner 
suburbs 
Affluent 
suburbs 
Periurban 
suburbs  Overall 
Overall number of 
municipalities 2010  7  175  71  203  456 
Population 2010 (mean)  158,624  8,280  4,432  1,859  7,130 
Foreign born 2010 (%)  40.1  29.2  32.6  19.9  25.8 
Unemployment 2010 (%)  3.3  2.6  2.0  1.8  2.2 
Median taxable income 2006 
(in CHF)  51,086  56,947  76,244  61,580  61,935 
Mean taxable income 2006 
(in CHF)  68,138  73,226  136,639  80,799  86,421 
Municipal gini coefficient of 
taxable income 2006 (mean)  0.393  0.358  0.520  0.368  0.388 
Source: Swiss Statistical Office, population census data 
With respect to the distribution of income within these municipalities, the figures in Table 2 show 
a number of interesting aspects. For all the four types of municipalities, the mean income is 
clearly above the median income, indicating that the number of taxpayers with very high income 
is rather small. This is also suggested by the average municipal Gini coefficients7 for income in 
the four types. Interestingly, the Gini coefficient is clearly highest in affluent suburbs, suggesting 
that the range between high and low incomes within this type of municipalities is high. No 
differences can be observed between the other three types: the Gini coefficient is slightly higher 
in core cities than in inner and periurban suburbs.  
Figure 1 allows a closer look at the distribution of income within the municipalities. It shows a 
close to linear relation between mean taxable income and the Gini-coefficients for taxable income 
at the municipal level. The heterogeneity of wealth thus increases with higher average income. 
(NB: the values of the Gini-coefficient for taxable income at the municipal level is not 
significantly correlated [p>0.05] with the number of taxpayers living in that municipality. Hence, 
we can exclude statistical effects of municipality size on income heterogeneity therein.) Whereas 
there are several rather poor municipalities with a rather homogenous population regarding the 
distribution of income, there is no affluent municipality with a homogeneously wealthy 
                                                 
7  This Gini coefficient theoretically ranges from 0 (all residents of a municipality have the same taxable income) to 1 (all 
taxable income in a municipality is earned by one resident, while all the others earn nothing) and can thus be used as indicator 
for homogeneity (low values) - or heterogeneity (high values) - of income.  
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population. Rather, the data suggest that in these municipalities, the high income average is due 
to the presence of some very rich taxpayers, while less wealthy residents continue to live there. 
Nevertheless, poor municipalities tend to be more homogenous, as is shown by the clustering of a 
large number of municipalities in the lower left quadrant of Figure 1. In other words: poor 
municipalities are rather homogenous but affluent suburbs are not. Affluent municipalities 
according to the typology of the Federal Statistical Office are defined as communes with high per 
capita revenues from federal income tax, but this does not mean that the corresponding 
population is a homogeneously wealthy one. In this sense, 'affluent suburbs' appear to be 
misnamed: a more adequate label would be 'suburbs with some very affluent taxpayers'.  
Figure 1: Distribution of residents' taxable income in municipalities of seven Swiss metropolitan areas (data 
for 2006) 
 
Source: Federal Tax Administration 
 
While we can thus distinguish clear territorial patterns of poverty and wealth within Swiss 
metropolitan areas, it must be emphasised that the spatial pattern of social hardship and economic 
wealth markedly differs between the seven metropolitan areas under scrutiny. This is shown by 
the metro level Gini coefficients measuring the distribution of unemployment (as an indicator for 
social hardship), as well as the distribution of federal income tax revenue (as an indicator for 
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wealth) across the municipalities within the different metropolitan areas (Table 3).8 First of all, 
the coefficients suggest that inequalities of affluence are more pronounced than inequalities of 
social hardship. Indeed, in all seven metropolitan areas the distribution of unemployment across 
municipalities is more equal than the distribution of income tax revenues. Unemployment is 
distributed most equally in Basle, followed by Geneva and Zurich, and more unequally than 
average in Bern, Lucerne, Lugano and Lausanne. Differences in the spatial distribution of wealth 
are more substantial. Inequality of wealth between municipalities is most unequal in the 
metropolitan area of Zurich, followed by Lucerne, Geneva and Lausanne. It is less unequal than 
average in the metropolitan areas of Lugano, Basel and Berne. Prima facie, however, 
distributions of poverty and wealth across municipalities do not appear to be linked to the 
institutional structure of the metropolitan areas. Neither of the two metro level Gini coefficients is 
significantly correlated to the index of geopolitical fragmentation.  
Table 3: Distribution of poverty and wealth in the seven major metropolitan areas 
Metropolitan 
area 
weighted Gini coeffcient of 
unemployment 2010 
weighted Gini coefficient of 
per capita federal tax 
revenues 2008 
Zurich  0.129  0.362 
Basel*  0.124  0.211 
Geneva*  0.127  0.318 
Berne  0.150  0.173 
Lausanne  0.164  0.316 
Lucerne  0.153  0.354 
Lugano*  0.156  0.215 
Mean  0.143  0.278 
*excluding foreign communes in cross‐border metropolitan areas 
 
4.1 Metropolitan patterns of public finance 
After examining the territorial patterns of the distribution of poverty and wealth in the seven 
Swiss metropolitan areas under scrutiny, we now turn to determining the territorial patterns of 
public service provision therein. In order to do so, we must first examine the role of the different 
state levels, before examining aspects of municipal public finance.  
                                                 
8  The value of these metro level Gini coefficients theoretically ranges from 0 (all municipalities have the same level of 
unemployment respectively income tax revenues) to 1 (all unemployment respectively all tax revenues concentrate in one 
single municipality). In order to eliminate the statistical effects of the unequal size of municipalities - measures of dispersion 
within a unit are influenced by the size of this unit - we use weighted Gini coefficients, i.e. the size of the population of the 
various municipalities was taken into account in the computation of the metro-level Gini coefficient.  
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Features of Swiss fiscal federalism 
Switzerland is a federalist state with three levels of government: the federation, twenty-six 
federate states - the so-called ‘cantons’ - and roughly 2600 municipalities - called ‘communes’. 
Swiss federalism can be considered as "decentralized federalism " (Braun, 2003a) due to the 
strong position of the cantons and the relative weakness of the federal government, not only in 
terms of legal competencies, but also in terms of fiscal resources and implementation power. The 
municipalities have no original powers granted to them constitutionally. The degree of municipal 
autonomy is subject to cantonal legislation, both in terms of legal competencies and fiscal 
resources. There is thus no unified ‘Swiss’ system of local government but rather twenty-six 
different cantonal systems.  But in general, and compared to other federations, local autonomy is 
quite high in Switzerland.  
At the core of Swiss federalism is the principle of tax autonomy of all three state levels, deeply 
enshrined in the federal constitution since 1848.  Not only the federal government, but also the 
cantons and the municipalities have the right to raise their own taxes on income and property. 
This principle of tax autonomy has sparked fiscal competition at the subnational level, which has 
become a characteristic feature of Swiss fiscal federalism (Braun, 2003b). Fiscal competition 
between cantons has led to the emergence of a wide range of different cantonal tax regimes, 
which differ not only with respect to overall levels of taxes, but also with respect to the 
progressivity of income tax (Gilardi et al., forthcoming). Additionally, there is fiscal competition 
between municipalities within cantons, and the municipal tax rates differ quite substantially 
across municipalities .  
These characteristic features of Swiss federalism are nicely reflected in the public finance figures 
shown in Table 4. The strong position of the cantons is mirrored in their share of the overall 
public expenditures (42.3%), which is considerably higher than that of the federation (33.6%) or 
of the municipalities (24.1%).  Somewhat untypically, however, the federal government has a 
leading role in the field of social policy: the federal government's share (41.1%) of overall social 
expenditures exceeds that of the cantons (38.8%). But the municipalities have a substantial role in 
this policy field as well (20.1% of the overall social expenditures). On the revenue side, the 
cantons clearly have the lion's share (42.2% of overall public revenues), compared with the 
federation (34.5%), or the municipalities (28.4%).   
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Table 4: Swiss fiscal federalism: selected figures of public finance 
      Federation  Cantons   Municipalities  Total 
Overall public 
expenditures 
in Mio. CHF  60'031  75'517  43'017  178'564 
in %  33.6  42.3  24.1  100.0 
Total transfer 
expenditures 
in Mio. CHF  37'850  34'186  12'219  84'254 
in %  44.9  40.6  14.5  100.0 
in % total exp.  63.1  45.3  28.4  47.2 
Overall public 
revenues 
in Mio. CHF  62'942  76'886  42'528  182'356 
in %  34.5  42.2  23.3  100.0 
Total transfer 
revenues 
in Mio. CHF  357  22'866  5'342  28'565 
in %  1.3  80.0  18.7  100.0 
in % total rev.  0.6  29.7  12.6  15.7 
Overall social 
expenditures 
in Mio. CHF  15'911  15'019  7'790  38'720 
in % 41.1 38.8 20.1 100.0 
in % total exp.  26.5  19.9  18.1  21.7 
Source: Federal Finance Administration (FFA), Financial Statistics 2010 
 
The figures in Table 4 also show the importance of transfer payments in Swiss fiscal federalism. 
Indeed, a large proportion of cantonal revenues (29.7%) consists of transfer payments that stem 
not only from the federation (vertical transfers), but also from other cantons (horizontal 
transfers). Transfers are also an important aspect in municipal finance: transfer payments account 
for more than a quarter of municipal expenditures (28.4%), as well as for a substantial part of 
municipal revenues (12.6%). Transfer payments are a sign of two tendencies in Swiss federalism. 
On the one hand, transfer payments are the result of Politikverflechtung  - or 'joint decision-
making' as Fritz Scharpf (1997)calls it. Indeed, the practice of policy-making in Swiss federalism 
rests on a multitude of mechanisms of intergovernmental cooperation, co-decision and co-
financing, not only vertically across state levels (see Klöti, 2000), but also horizontally between 
jurisdictions at the same level (see Bochsler, 2010) - i.e. between cantons and between 
municipalities. On the other hand, transfer payments are at the core of equalization schemes that 
have been set up since the middle of the 20th century, in order to counteract horizontal fiscal 
imbalances at the subnational level. Equalization schemes exist both at the national level 
(horizontal equalization between cantons), as well as within cantons (horizontal equalization 
between municipalities).  
However, this general pattern of Swiss fiscal federalism is subject to considerable variation 
between different cantons. Because municipalities are subjects of cantonal law, their rights and 
duties vary across cantons. This is evident from the figures on overall, social and transfer 
expenditures of those cantons with at least one municipality in one of the seven metropolitan 
18 
areas under scrutiny (Table 5). First of all, comparing the share of overall expenditures from 
cantons to the one of their municipalities, it appears that in the small urban cantons of Basel-City 
(BS) and Geneva (GE) more than 80% (GE) or even 98% (BS) of all expenditures come from the 
canton. This is not surprising because Basel-City consists more or less of the city Basle, whereas 
the highly centralized canton Geneva is strongly characterized by its central city. On the other 
side of the spectrum, we find Zurich, where total expenditures between canton and municipalities 
are close to fifty-fifty. Lucerne (LU), Aargau (AG), Solothurn (SO) and Schwyz (SZ) too, have a 
highly decentralized expenditure structure with around 40% of all expenditures coming from the 
municipalities. In the remaining six cantons, municipal expenditures make up for between 30% 
(Fribourg FR) and 35% of total expenditures. The 131 municipalities of the metropolitan area of 
Zurich are in three cantons that belong to the ones with the highest municipal share regarding 
total expenditures. A same picture appears regarding the smaller metropolitan area of Lucerne. 
Regarding social expenditures, there are again Basel-City and Geneva, together with Nidwalden 
(NW) that have the smallest amount of expenditures by the communes. In these cantons, social 
expenditures are mainly paid by the cantons. On the other side, again Zurich with high 57% and 
Lucerne with over 40% have high shares of municipal social expenditures. Also Solothurn (SO) 
with a 40%  share of municipal expenditures can be seen as a canton with high municipal social 
expenditures. This indicates a high municipal autonomy in these cantons.  
Not only social expenditures by municipalities, but also transfer expenditures are highest in the 
canton of Zurich. 47% of all transfer revenues in the canton Zurich come from the municipalities. 
Taken together, the share of total as well as social and transfer expenditures between the canton 
and its municipalities is clearly highest in Zurich. On the other side, the cantons Basel-City and 
Geneva have large shares of expenditures paid by the cantonal level, indicating a rather low 
financial autonomy of the municipalities. 
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Table 5: Public expenditures of cantons and municipalities in the seven major metropolitan areas (in 2010) 
Metropo‐
litan area
Total 
munici‐
palities 
Cantons 
w. 
munici‐
palities 
total expenditures  social expenditures  transfer expenditures 
canton  communes*  canton  communes*  canton  communes* 
Mio. 
CHF  in % 
Mio. 
CHF  in %
Mio. 
CHF  in % 
Mio. 
CHF  in %
Mio. 
CHF  in % 
Mio. 
CHF  in %
Zurich  131  ZH: 104  11'536  50.5 11'308  49.5 1'902  42.6 2'560  57.4 4'730  52.6 4'258  47.4
AG: 24  4'166  60.1 2'765  39.9 701  64.1 393  35.9 2'016  72.7 756  27.3
SZ: 3  1'095  61.4 688  38.6 159  62.8 94  37.2 676  83.2 136  16.8
Basle  74  BS: 3  4'293  98.0 87  2.0  797  97.7 19  2.3  1'547  97.7 36  2.3 
BL: 52  2'421  69.8 1'048  30.2 458  70.9 188  29.1 1'313  85.9 216  14.1
SO: 11  1'894  60.8 1'223  39.2 393  60.0 262  40.0 1'117  78.5 306  21.5
AG: 8  4'166  60.1 2'765  39.9 701  64.1 393  35.9 2'016  72.7 756  27.3
Geneva  74  GE: 42  8'430  81.3 1'940  18.7 1'743  86.0 284  14.0 3'676  89.4 435  10.6
VD: 32  7'708  67.4 3'737  32.6 1'761  67.5 847  32.5 4'110  79.4 1'065  20.6
Berne  42  BE: 39  10'129  68.1 4'740  31.9 2'158  63.4 1'243  36.6 4'744  72.7 1'781  27.3
FR: 3  2'943  70.0 1'260  30.0 518  76.9 156  23.1 1'298  73.5 469  26.5
Lausanne  69  VD: 69  7'708  67.4 3'737  32.6 1'761  67.5 847  32.5 4'110  79.4 1'065  20.6
Lucerne  16  LU: 14  3'058  60.0 2'043  40.0 605  59.4 413  40.6 1'764  74.5 603  25.5
NW: 1  331  67.1 162  32.9 51  90.0 6  10.0 169  92.4 14  7.6 
SZ: 1  1'095  61.4 688  38.6 159  62.8 94  37.2 676  83.2 136  16.8
Lugano  50  TI: 50  3'209  65.5 1'693  34.5 852  78.1 239  21.9 1'482  79.1 390  20.9
Source: Federal Finance Association FFA, Financial Statistics 2010 
* sum of all communes within a canton, including commues outside the metropolitan areas 
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Municipal public finance in the seven metropolitan areas 
Table 6 provides an overview of municipal finance in the seven metropolitan areas under 
scrutiny. It clearly shows that there are substantial differences across municipalities within 
metropolitan areas. In all seven metropolitan areas except Geneva (and Basle, where such data is 
not available), revenues and expenditures per capita are highest in the core cities. Periurban 
suburbs have the lowest per capita expenditures in all metropolitan areas except in Geneva. As 
we have seen previously, affluent suburbs are those where wealthy taxpayers live. Nevertheless, 
per capita municipal revenues and expenditures are not higher in affluent suburbs than in the 
other types of municipalities. This apparent paradox is explained by a look at the figures of the 
tax rate index: affluent suburbs indeed have the lowest tax rate. This means that taxpayers in 
affluent suburbs contribute a smaller proportion of their income as tax, compared with taxpayers 
living in other municipalities.  
Second, there are also substantial differences between overall levels of per capita municipal 
revenues and expenditures across the seven metropolitan areas. Most significant are the 
differences in per capita social expenditures: they range from an average of 996 CHF in Basle to 
2'225 CHF in Lausanne. This does not necessarily mean, however, that residents of the Lausanne 
metropolitan area are treated more generously than those in Basel. As we have seen previously 
(see Table 5), the share of the municipalities in social expenditures varies substantially across 
cantons and it might well be that low municipal expenditures are compensated by a higher 
expenditure levels of the canton. In order to account for these cross-cantonal differences, we have 
calculated the per capita of overall social expenditures, by adding the presumed cantonal social 
expenditures per capita in a municipality.9 The new figure displays considerably smaller 
differences between level of social expenditures in metropolitan municipalities. Nevertheless, 
some significant differences remain both across and within metropolitan areas. Levels of social 
expenditures are low in the municipalities of the Basel, the Zurich and the Bern metropolitan 
areas, while they are high in the municipalities of the Lugano, the Geneva and the Lausanne 
metropolitan area. Lucerne is situated in the middle. With respect to municipal types, social 
expenditures are generally highest in the core cities, still quite high in affluent suburbs, but lower  
                                                 
9  This is an extrapolation from the municipal social expenditures per capita, which was obtained by  multiplying the per capita 
social expenditures of a municipality with the ratio between the cantonal and the municipal share in the overall social 
expenditures (see Table 5) .  
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Table 6: Municipal finance in the seven major metropolitan areas, means for municipal types (in 2010) 
 
Metro. 
area
Type of 
municipality
Municipal 
revenues 
(CHF p.c.)1
Municipal 
expenditures 
(CHF p.c.)1
Municipal 
tax rate 
index2
Municipal 
social 
expenditures 
(CHF p.c.)
Overall social 
expenditures 
in municipality 
(CHF p.c. )* 
Left parties 
(% of votes)3
Core cities 20'897 20'978 109.6 9'639 16'804 42.9
Inner sub. 5'425 4'966 97.1 2'112 3'813 23.5
Affluent sub. 8'699 8'404 77.3 2'310 4'093 19.2
Periurban sub. 4'456 4'064 96.8 1'266 2'479 22.2
Overall 5'572 5'167 94.4 1'840 3'389 22.6
Core cities n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a. 47.6
Inner sub. 4'193 3'152 97.3 1'221 3'929 37.2
Affluent sub. 4'632 3'620 77.4 1'147 3'947 36.4
Periurban sub. 4'041 2'701 100.6 847 2'650 32.4
Overall 4'128 2'912 98.1 996 3'174 34.5
Core cities 5'799 5'104 107.4 978 6'992 47.3
Inner sub. 3'975 3'286 102.6 946 5'301 38.0
Affluent sub. 6'165 5'228 86.0 1'848 7'199 28.4
Periurban sub. 5'552 4'700 95.4 2'067 6'884 32.4
Overall 5'399 4'557 93.6 1'676 6'607 32.4
Core cities 9'257 8'368 90.9 3'613 9'884 52.5
Inner sub. 4'869 4'178 86.6 1'861 5'091 30.2
Affluent sub. 5'245 4'979 58.4 2'285 6'253 30.1
Periurban sub. 3'942 3'170 92.2 1'190 3'256 28.4
Overall 4'492 3'763 89.0 1'555 4'256 29.7
Core cities 13'232 12'287 112.6 2'808 8'642 56.6
Inner sub. 5'576 5'003 95.7 2'147 6'610 42.0
Affluent sub. 8'452 7'735 81.2 3'149 9'692 35.1
Periurban sub. 5'347 4'649 96.9 2'005 6'170 37.0
Overall 5'971 5'319 94.6 2'225 6'849 38.9
Core cities 8'580 7'549 87.2 3'652 8'998 39.8
Inner sub. 5'597 4'318 92.5 2'231 5'497 21.7
Affluent sub. 7'136 5'874 57.3 1'241 3'057 15.2
Periurban sub. 4'488 2'845 91.6 1'068 2'631 19.8
Overall 5'603 4'239 89.4 1'929 4'754 21.6
Core cities 7'336 6'535 78.8 2'562 11'688 23.8
Inner sub. 5'228 4'320 85.0 1'482 6'763 21.5
Affluent sub. 5'268 4'383 78.8 1'394 6'361 22.8
Periurban sub. 3'849 3'074 96.0 1'088 4'963 27.8
Overall 4'686 3'840 88.7 1'323 6'034 24.3
Core cities 10'850 10'137 97.8 3'875 10'501 44.3
Inner sub. 5'038 4'336 94.9 1'764 4'971 30.2
Affluent sub. 6'886 6'141 81.2 2'026 6'363 26.5
Periurban sub. 4'505 3'698 96.8 1'346 3'938 29.2
Overall 5'170 4'415 93.6 1'649 4'807 29.4
*excluding foreign communes in cross‐border metropolitan areas
1 without function education
Lugano*
Overall
Zürich
Basle*
Geneva*
Berne
Lausanne
Lucerne
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Table 7: Municipal transfers in the seven major metropolitan areas, means for types of municipalites (in 2010) 
Metropolitan 
area
Type of 
municipality N
Revenues per capita 
(in CHF) without 
transfers
Expendiures per capita 
(in CHF) without 
transfers
Transfer revenues 
(% of total 
revenues)
Transfer 
expenditures (% of 
total expenditures)
Core cities 1 21'014 22'515 1.0 4.6
Inner sub. 56 5'097 4'753 8.2 20.2
Affluent sub. 17 8'577 5'776 3.2 34.0
Periurban sub. 54 3'967 3'505 12.2 26.9
Overall 128 5'207 4'501 9.2 24.8
Core cities n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Inner sub. 25 4'010 3'090 11.9 31.4
Affluent sub. 4 4'707 3'233 4.7 34.6
Periurban sub. 42 3'891 2'851 9.2 31.4
Overall 71 3'979 2'957 9.9 31.6
Core cities 1 5'640 5'034 3.1 6.6
Inner sub. 19 3'764 3'488 5.1 19.7
Affluent sub. 30 5'805 4'694 4.1 34.6
Periurban sub. 24 5'062 5'155 7.5 40.8
Overall 74 5'038 4'538 5.5 32.4
Core cities 1 7'332 6'101 23.2 35.2
Inner sub. 16 4'140 2'645 14.5 46.0
Affluent sub. 1 4'352 2'330 15.4 58.2
Periurban sub. 21 3'735 2'257 6.8 44.6
Overall 39 4'010 2'516 10.6 45.2
Core cities 1 11'969 23'451 11.8 12.9
Inner sub. 26 4'886 6'364 13.8 44.1
Affluent sub. 8 7'201 8'374 14.2 49.9
Periurban sub. 27 4'681 5'972 13.5 44.9
Overall 62 5'210 6'728 13.7 44.7
Core cities 1 8'536 6'769 5.9 25.4
Inner sub. 8 5'601 4'435 10.4 29.8
Affluent sub. 1 7'138 6'049 4.9 19.4
Periurban sub. 4 4'429 2'909 13.8 43.7
Overall 14 5'586 4'281 10.7 32.7
Core cities 1 6'971 5'213 7.2 29.6
Inner sub. 20 5'145 3'085 5.9 36.4
Affluent sub. 7 5'277 3'299 3.0 36.8
Periurban sub. 21 3'766 2'413 9.0 36.9
Overall 49 4'610 2'871 6.8 36.5
Core cities 6 10'244 11'514 8.7 19.0
Inner sub. 170 4'695 4'204 9.7 30.2
Affluent sub. 68 6'541 5'153 5.2 36.6
Periurban sub. 193 4'149 3'646 10.2 35.5
Overall 437 4'817 4'206 9.2 33.4
Sources: cantonale financial and statistical offices
Lugano*
Overall
Zürich
Basle*
Geneva*
Berne
Lausanne
Lucerne
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in inner and periurban suburbs. Lausanne is an exception  in the sense that affluent suburbs there 
show higher levels of social expenditures than the core city.  
What role do transfer payments play in public finance of metropolitan municipalities? To answer 
this question, we calculated municipal revenues and expenditures without transfer payments 
(Table 7). Shares of transfer expenditures on total expenditures are lowest in the core cities, 
except in the metropolitan area of Lucerne. Whereas other municipalities have higher shares of 
transfers, core cities appear to be excluded from transfer systems insofar as they do not pay large 
amounts of transfers to other jurisdictions, and have only small shares of transfer revenues. 
Transfer payments are clearly more important in the suburban municipalities. Affluent suburbs 
turn out to be those with the highest share of transfer expenditures, while the share of transfer 
revenues is rather low. Compared with the other suburbs, they contribute more to transfer 
systems, but receive less. The reverse is true for inner suburbs and periurban suburbs: the share of 
transfer revenues is higher and the share of transfer expenditures is lower.  
4.3 Explaining social expenditures in metropolitan municipalities 
With respect to the SSGI thesis, one of the core questions to be answered is to what extent public 
resources are allocated to places where they are needed. In order to answer this question, we 
performed regression analyses on the overall per capita social expenditures in the municipalities 
(Table 8). Four different models were estimated. A dummy variable for core cities was included 
in all models in order to control for the fact that these present specificities in many respects.  
The first regression model is a 'social needs'-model. It estimates the effects of socio-demographic 
characteristics which we assume to measure the extent of social needs in a municipality: the 
proportion of immigrants, the proportion of economically dependent residents (aged under 18 or 
above 65), the unemployment rate, as well as the median taxable income. The results show that 
social needs apparently do play a role in explaining the level of social expenditures: the higher 
the proportions of immigrants and economically dependent residents, the higher social 
expenditures in a municipality. The unemployment rate is not significantly associated with social 
expenditures. This might have to do with the fact that the unemployment insurance is a federal 
institution in Switzerland, and expenditures for unemployment benefits are not incurred by 
cantons or municipalities.  Contrary to the expectations, however, the level of residents' tax 
income is not negatively but positively associated with social expenditures.  
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Table 8: Determinants of overall per capita social expenditures in municipalities of Swiss metropolitan areas 
Variables  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 
Constant 
Core city (dummy)  .208  .085  .213  .040 
Foreign population (in percent, 2010)  .386  .298 
Dependents (in percent, 2010)  .171  .124 
Unemployment (percent seeking job 2010) .062  .040 
Taxable income (median, 2006)  .164  .032 
Municipal revenues excluding transfers 
(per capita, 2010) 
.574  .493 
Municipal tax rate (index, 2010)  ‐.150  ‐.178 
Revenues from transfers (percent of 
overall municipal revenues, 2010) 
.163  .184 
Votes for left parties (mean of share in 
2007 and 2011 national elections) 
  .156  .162 
Adjusted R2  0.312  0.413  0.083  0.573 
Number of observations 436 437 438  436 
Standardized OLS regression coefficients (boldface coefficients are significant at p<0.01) 
 
The second model is a 'public finance'-model. It includes variables which we can assume to 
measure the financial situation and fiscal profile of a municipality. The results clearly indicate 
that the level of social expenditures in a municipality is influenced by characteristics of municipal 
public finance. It is positively associated with municipal revenues (the higher the public revenues 
of a municipality, the higher its social expenditures), and negatively associated with municipal 
tax effort (the lower the tax rate, the higher the level of social expenditures). The share of 
municipal revenues stemming from transfer payments also play a role: the more significant 
transfer payments are, the higher the level of social expenditures. Interestingly, a look at the 
explained variance show that the 'public finance'- model has a higher explanatory power (adj. 
R2=41.3%) than the 'social needs'- model (adj. R2=31.2%).   
The third model is a 'political' model, showing that the level of social expenditures within a 
metropolitan municipality also depends on its electorate's political preferences. The higher the 
percentage of votes for left parties - whom we know to be more favourable to redistribution of 
income and expansive social policies - the higher the level of social expenditures.  
Finally, the fourth model combines the three previous ones. The results show that most of the    
predictors remain significant. The level of social expenditures in a metropolitan municipality is 
not only influenced by social needs, but also by public finance and political preferences.  
Whether public resources are invested in social policies not only depends on the extent of needs 
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within a municipality, but also on whether the municipality was able to actually generated the 
revenues necessary to afford social policies - be that because they can extract resources from a 
good tax base or because they benefit from transfer payments by other jurisdictions. This 
indicates that, in Swiss metropolitan areas, public resources indeed seem to be allocated to places 
where there is a certain need, but that these needs are covered in a more comprehensive way in 
municipalities that are already affluent. The importance of the political factor also indicates that 
political choices at the municipal level play a crucial role: rich municipalities with weak left 
parties will be less likely to invest in social policies.  
A closer look into the strengths of the predictors from the combined model shows that 
metropolitan geopolitical fragmentation plays a role (Figure 2). On the one hand, the relationship 
between social needs (measured by the percentage of immigrants) and the level of social 
expenditures is stronger in metropolitan areas that are less fragmented, and weaker in the more 
fragmented ones.10 On the other hand, the effect of the financial situation of a municipality (as 
measured by municipal revenues per capita) is stronger in more fragmented metropolitan areas. 
This suggests that geopolitical fragmentation of Swiss metropolitan areas is associated to a 
mismatch between needs and resources. The more fragmented a metropolitan area, the less the 
allocation of policy resources in a municipality is associated with the extent of social needs 
within it, but rather with the municipal revenues that can be extracted from the residents. 
However, no clear results can be drawn with respect to the political preference effect - the 
relationship between left vote and social expenditures is, in fact, not statistically significant for 
the subsample of the more fragmented metropolitan areas.  
Besides metropolitan geopolitical fragmentation, vertical relations between municipalities and 
their canton also play a role in determining per capita social expenditures in a municipality 
(Figure 3). In more centralised a cantons, the effects of social needs (measured by the percentage 
of immigrants) on social expenditures is stronger.11 And in more decentralised a cantons, political 
preferences of a municipalities' electorate have a stronger effect on per capita social expenditures 
in this municipality. While centralisation is good for equity, local autonomy is good for 
                                                 
10  The distinction between more and less fragmented metropolitan areas is based on a classification around the median of the 
geopolitical fragmentation index (see Table 1) ( median = 4.0). More precisely, the metropolitan areas of Zurich, Bern, 
Lucerne and Geneva were classified as 'less fragmented'. The metropolitan areas of Basel, Lausanne and Lugano were 
classified as 'more fragmented'.  
11  The distinction between centralised and decentralised cantons is based on a classification around the median share of cantonal 
expenditures with respect to the overall social expenditures within a canton (see Table 4) (median =  67.5%). The cantons BS, 
BL, GE, FR, NW, VD and TI were classified as 'centralised'. The cantons ZH, AG, SZ, SO, BE, LU were classified as 
'decentralised'.  
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Figure 2: The fragmentation effect: per capita social expenditures in municipalities as functions of metropolitan geopolitical fragmentation, as well as socio-
demographic, public finance and political variables.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The centralisation effect:  per capita social expenditures in municipalities as functions of centralisation/decentralisation of social expenditures 
within cantons, as well as socio-demographic, public finance and political variables 
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democracy. Quite unexpectedly, however, cantonal centralisation seems to reinforce the public 
finance effect: in centralised cantons, municipal revenues are a stronger predictor for social 
expenditures than in decentralised cantons.  
5. Discussion  
The general features of the Swiss case suggest that metropolitan areas in Switzerland are indeed a 
good empirical example to investigate the SSGI thesis, and particularly the aspects related to the 
intergovernmental and multi-level character of the metropolitan governance compound. In terms 
of the institutional setting, Swiss metropolitan areas are highly fragmented into large numbers of 
relatively small jurisdictions - and in that aspect very much resemble the US metropolitan areas 
on which most of the SSGI research has been conducted to date.  In terms of governance, 
municipal autonomy is comparatively high in Swiss federalism and allows substantial discretion 
in local choices. This is also similar to the US case. But, to the difference of the US, Swiss fiscal 
federalism entails a number of transfer and equalization mechanisms, not only vertically between 
cantons and municipalities, but also horizontally between municipalities. The characteristics of 
these mechanisms vary across cantons and thereby make the Swiss metropolitan areas 
particularly appealing cases to study the effects of higher-level government  interventions and 
intergovernmental coordination on redistributive policies in metropolitan areas.  
With respect to residential sorting, we do see that there are territorial patterns of social 
segregation according to social status and lifestyle, distinguishing between core cities, inner 
suburbs, periurban suburbs and affluent suburbs. The SSGI proposition P1 is thus confirmed: 
households with similar status or lifestyle tend to seek residence near one another. However, the 
homogeneity of these municipalities varies. Poor municipalities tend to be more homogenous. 
Affluent municipalities are actually only affluent in average, due to the presence of a small 
number of very rich residents. For the Swiss case, proposition P3 of the SSGI thesis is thus not 
entirely supported: while social segregation in Swiss metropolitan areas has led to the emergence 
of relatively homogenous poor suburbs, we do not see similarly homogenous wealthy places.  
Nevertheless, our analysis of the relationship between socio-demographic and financial data 
clearly shows that social segregation across municipalities in Swiss metropolitan areas is 
paralleled by a segregation of the tax base, and also affects service levels across municipalities. 
Even though the transfer systems have a moderating effect, at the end of the day suburbs with 
wealthy taxpayers have higher revenues, and also spend more on public services than suburbs 
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whose taxpayers are not so wealthy. These results thus clearly support the SSGI proposition P5 in 
the Swiss case: the higher the social status of a municipality, the larger the resources available, 
and the more this municipality spends to support public services, while it is still able to impose a 
lower tax charge on their residents. Our analysis of the relationship between social expenditures 
and political variables supports the idea that this stems from a deliberate choice: the wealthy 
municipalities have an electorate that leans towards the right and is therefore interested in 
keeping taxes low. A more left leaning municipal electorate, however, is more likely to set a 
higher tax rate and to increase social expenditures. These observations provide empirical support 
for proposition P2: municipalities provide the political context by which residents shape the 
municipal tax-service package according to their political preferences.  
Our analysis also presents a clear answer to proposition P7,  i.e. that core cities tend to allocate 
services in favour of the poor. Indeed, cities were found to have higher levels of social 
expenditures. This can be explained not only by the fact that core cities also benefit from higher 
levels of public revenue - mainly due to revenues from tax on businesses located primarily in the 
core cities. The political aspect is equally important: core city electorates lean more to the left and 
therefore are more likely to favour governmental spending on social policies. Of course, we do 
not know whether this spending necessarily translates into higher levels of services  - for the time 
being, we have to assume that service efficiency is constant across jurisdictions. Hence, 
proposition P6 (spending levels are related to service levels in a linear way) could not be tested 
empirically.  
On the whole, our analysis supports the SSGI thesis quite straightforwardly, but also allows some 
important qualifications, in particular with respect to the effects of higher level government 
interventions and intergovernmental transfers. On the one hand, we could show that in the 
governmentally fragmented Swiss metropolitan areas, social policies are not only shaped by the 
extent of social needs, but also and even more strongly by the availability of public revenues 
(which is strongly conditioned by the municipal tax base), as well as political preferences. In the 
fragmented institutional setting of the Swiss metropolis, social policies mainly appear as an act of 
voluntarism by the rich, rather than a matter of redistribution oriented by principles of social 
justice. This conclusion is also warranted when we look at variations across the seven 
metropolitan areas within Switzerland: the relationship between resources and expenditures is 
stronger in more fragmented settings, and the relationship between needs and expenditures is 
stronger in less fragmented settings.  
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On the other hand, however, our analysis suggests that qualifications to the SSGI thesis are 
needed with respect to the effects of higher level government interventions and 
intergovernmental coordination. Indeed, we have shown that the mismatch between social needs 
and social expenditures is moderated by the degree of cantonal centralisation. In more centralised 
cantons, the link between needs and expenditures is stronger, while the link between public 
revenues and social expenditures is weaker. This finding strongly supports Elinor Ostrom's 
argument that higher-level government interventions in metropolitan redistribution can attenuate 
the SSGI problem. Even though, we yet need to understand to what extent horizontal 
coordination between municipalities also play a role in this mechanism. Limitations of the data 
collected for this analysis have not allowed us to delve to the necessary depth of this topic.  
Hence, further research is needed to fully understand the workings of the multi-level compound 
of metropolitan governance and its effects on the shaping of social policies in the metropolitan 
areas. For the moment, our analysis shows that the SSGI thesis can be supported for the case of 
Switzerland: although higher-level governments and intermunicipal coordination play an 
important moderating role, institutional fragmentation of Swiss metropolitan areas still clearly is 
an important obstacle to the reduction of territorially structured social inequalities.   
30 
 
6. References 
Bassand, M. (2005) La métropolisation de la Suisse, Lausanne, Presses polytechniques et 
universitaires romandes. 
Bochsler, D. (2010) Horizontale Zusammenarbeit als Lösung des Problems der Kleinräumigkeit 
im Schweizer Föderalismus? Eine quantitative Perspektive. IN Auer, A. (Ed.) 
Herausforderung HarmoS: Bildungspolitik, Föderalismus und Demokratie auf dem 
Prüfstand. Zürich, Schulthess. 
Braun, D. (2003a) Dezentraler und unitarischer Föderalismus. Die Schweiz und Deutschland im 
Vergleich. Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft, 9, 57-89. 
Braun, D. (2003b) Fiscal policies in federal states, Aldershot, Ashgate. 
Brenner, N. (2002) Decoding the newest 'metropolitan regionalism' in the USA: a critical 
overview. Cities, 19, 3-21. 
Downs, A. (1994) New visions for metropolitan America, Washington (DC), Brookings 
Institutions. 
Gilardi, F., Kübler, D. & Wasserfallen, F. (forthcoming) Cantonal tax autonomy in Switzerland: 
history, trends and challenges. IN Ruiz Almendral, V. & Vaillancourt, F. (Eds.) Autonomy 
in subnational income taxes: evolving powers, existing practices in seven countries. 
Montréal, McGill-Queen's University Press. 
Hermann, M., Heye, C. & Leuthold, H. (2005) Soziokulturelle Unterschiede in der Schweiz. Vier 
Indizes zu räumlichen Disparitäten 1990-2000, Neuchâtel, Bundesamt für Statistik. 
Hill, R. C. (1974) Separate and unequal: governmental inequality in the metropolis. American 
Political Science Review, 68, 1557-1568. 
Hoffmann-Martinot, V. & Sellers, J. (2005) Conclusion: the metropolitanization of politics. IN 
Hoffmann-Martinot, V. & Sellers, J. (Eds.) Metropolitanization and political change. 
Opladen, Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
Huissoud, T., Stofer, S., Cunha, A. & Schuler, M. (1999) Structures et tendances de la 
différenciation dans les espaces urbains en Suisse. Lausanne, IREC_DA/EPFL. 
Joye, D., Schuler, M., Nef, R. & Bassand, M. (1988) Le système des communes suisses. Approche 
typologique du modèle centre-périphérie, Berne, Office fédéral de la statistique. 
Klöti, U. (2000) Regieren im verflochtenen dreistufigen Föderalismus. IN Knoepfel, P. & Linder, 
W. (Eds.) Verwaltung, Regierung und Verfassung im Wandel. Gedächtnisschrift für 
Raimund E. Germann. Basel, Helbing und Lichtenhahn. 
Kübler, D. (2003) 'Metropolitan governance' oder: die unendliche Geschichte der 
Institutionenbildung in Stadtregionen. Informationen zur Raumentwicklung, 9, 535-541. 
Kübler, D., Scheuss, U. & Rochat, P. (2013) The metropolitan bases of political cleavage in 
Switzerland. IN Sellers, J., Kübler, D., Walter-Rogg, M. & Walks, R. A. (Eds.) The 
political ecology of the metropolis. Essex, ECPR Press. 
Lefèvre, C. (1998) Metropolitan Government and Governance in Western Countries: A Critical 
Review. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 22, 9-25. 
Lowery, D. (1999a) Answering the public choice challenge: a neoprogressive research agenda. 
Governance, 12, 29-55. 
Lowery, D. (1999b) Sorting in the fragmented metropolis: updating the Social Strafication - 
Government Inequality debate. Public management review, 1, 7-26. 
31 
Lowery, D. (2000) A transaction costs model of metropolitan governance: allocation versus 
redistribution in urban america. Journal of public administration research and theory, 10, 
49-78. 
Massey, D. S. & Denton, N. A. (1993) American Apartheid: segregation and the making of the 
underclass, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press. 
Neimann (1976) Social stratification and government inequality. American Political Science 
Review, 70, 149-154. 
Ostrom, E. (1972) Metropolitan reform: propositions derived from two traditions. Social Science 
Quarterly, 53, 474-493. 
Ostrom, E. (1983) The social stratification-government inequality thesis explored. Urban affairs 
quarterly, 19, 91-112. 
Savitch, H. & Vogel, R. K. (2000) Paths to new regionalism. State and local government review, 
32, 158-168. 
Savitch, H. & Vogel, R. K. (2009) Regionalism and urban politics. IN Davies, J. S. & Imbroscio, 
D. L. (Eds.) Theories of urban politics. 2 ed. London, Sage. 
Scharpf, F. (1997) Games real actors play. Actor-centered institutionalism and policy research, 
Boulder (Co), Westview. 
Schuler, M. (1984) Abgrenzung der Agglomerationsräume in der Schweiz 1980/Délimitation des 
agglomérations en Suisse 1980, Bern, Bundesamt für Statistik. 
Schuler, M. (1999) Régionalisation et urbanisation: des concepts convergents? Département 
d'Architecture. Lausanne, Ecole polytechnique fédérale de Lausanne. 
Schuler, M., Dessemontet, P. & Joye, D. (2005a) Die Raumgliederungen der Schweiz, Neuchâtel, 
Bundesamt für Statistik. 
Schuler, M., Dessemontet, P. & Joye, D. (2005b) Les niveaux géographiques de la Suisse. 
Recensement fédéral de la population 2000, Neuchâtel, Office fédéral de la statistique. 
Wallis, A. D. (1994) The third wave: current trends in regional governance. National civic 
review, 83, 290-310. 
Zeigler, D. J. & Brunn, S. D. (1980) Geopolitical fragmentation and the pattern of growth and 
need. IN Brunn, S. D. & Wheeler, J. O. (Eds.) The American metropolitan system: present 
and future. New York, John Wiley. 
 
 
 
 
32 
 
7. Methodological Appendix 
The analyses presented in this chapter draw on municipal level data about socio-demographic 
composition, spatial context and public finances in the year 2010, in the seven largest 
metropolitan areas in Switzerland – i.e. over or near 200’000 inhabitants (seeTable 1). Most data 
was provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, the Swiss Federal Tax Administration, the 
Federal Finance Administration (FFA), and the State Secretariat for Economic Affairs (SECO). 
Data on local public finance in the seven metropolitan areas under scrutiny was provided by the 
cantonal statistical offices and the finance administration of the cantons of Aargau, Zurich, 
Geneva, Vaud, Basel-Landschaft, Solothurn, Berne, Lucerne and Ticino. No financial data could 
be collected from the cantons of Schwyz, Basel-City, Fribourg and Nidwalden. The following 
table presents the operationalization of the variables used throughout the analysis.  
 
Table 9: Operational description of variables used 
Variable name definition missing values 
  commune-level variables   
Population 2010 Municipal population at  31.12. 2010 0/456 
Foreign born 2010 (%) Foreign born / population size *100 0/456 
Unemployment 2010 (%) Registered unemployed / Total population between 18 and 65 
years old *100 
8/456 
Federal direct tax per capita (2008) Total federal tax perceived in municipality / population size 0/456 
New housing 2010 proportion of dwelling houses built during the last 20 years 
(without renovations) 
0/456 
Type of communes 2010 Typology of communes, 4 Types 0/456 
Vote for left parties 2007 and 2011 
 
Cumulative percentage of votes for the Social Democratic Party, 
the Green Party, the Christian Socialist Party, Workers' Party, 
as well as Solidarités in the 2011 national election 
0/456 
Municipal Gini-coefficient 2006 Municipal Gini-coefficients taxable income, Federal income tax 
2006 
1/456 
Municipal mean income 2006 Municipal mean taxable income, Federal income tax 2006 1/456 
Municipal median income 2006 Municipal median taxable income, Federal income tax 2006 1/456 
   Local public finance data of metropolitan areas  
Total revenue per capita (2010) total local revenue / population size  19/456 
Total expenditure per capita (2010) total local expenditure / population size  19/456 
Transfer revenues 2010 share of transfer payments revenue relative to total local 
revenue 
19/456 
Transfer expenditures 2010 share of transfer payments expenditure relative to total local 
expenditure 
19/456 
General administration expenditures Sum of expenditures of the official functional categories 
- general administration 
19/456 
Redistributive expenditures Sum of expenditures of the official functional categories 
- health 
- public transport operation subsidies 
- social welfare  
- housing subsidies 
19/456 
Amenities and other operational costs Sum of expenditures of the official functional categories 
- culture and leisure  
- environment and spatial planning 
- public safety, local police, fire brigades 
- libraries 
- recreation 
- entertainment 
19/456 
Tax rate index 2010 index: 100*(tij/mean(tj)), 
where: 
t: tax rate 
i: commune subscript 
j: canton subscript 
19/456 
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   MA-level variables   
Gini coefficient   
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where: 
G: Gini coefficient 
X: cumulative percentage of population 
Y: cumulative percentage of either total expenditures, total 
revenues or redistributive expenditure per capita 
Unemployment: 
0/7 
Finances: 
0/7 
Metropolitan population population size of metropolitan area 0/7 
Fragmentation (Zeigler-Brunn) number of communes per 10,000 inhabitants divided by the 
central city’s share of the overall metropolitan population in 
percent 
0/7 
   Cantonal level variables   
Overall cantonal public expenditures 2010 Total public expenditures by canton 2010 0/13 
Overall municipal public expenditures 2010 Total public expenditures by municipalities, aggregated on 
cantonal level 2010 
0/13 
Overall cantonal social expenditures 2010 Total social expenditures by canton 2010 0/13 
Overall municipal social expenditures 2010 Total social expenditures by municipalities, aggregated on 
cantonal level 2010 
0/13 
Total cantonal transfer expenditures 2010 Total transfer expenditures by canton 2010 0/13 
Total municipal transfer expenditures 2010 Total transfer expenditures by municipalities, aggregated on 
cantonal level 2010 
0/13 
Sources: 
- mean income federal income tax, Gini coefficients on communal level (taxable income 2006), mean and median taxable income: Swiss Federal Tax Administration 
- local public finance data: statistical offices and finance administrations of cantons  
- Unemployed 2010: State Secretariat for Economic Affairs SECO 
- Financial statistics 2010: Federal Finance Administration 
- all other data: Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
